BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO SIGNALING STUART I. GREENBAUM V.
legal reserve the private capital market's ability to price bank deposits. In the model developed here, has less bank assets and a bank can therefore superior through choice reserves. Mandatory reserves can inhibit such and in deposit pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the basics of fractional reserve banking were explained by the rationale for legal reserve requirements. as well as the details of their design, have continued to evolve. and the impetus for reform has been gathering momentum in recent years. The time-honored liquidity motivation. as well as the more monelary consideration, have been widely debated: and while the latter remains popular. increasing skepticism has expressed by Benston and Kanatas 19811, Robertson and Phillips and among others. Like of these this one questions the benefits of reserve requirements. Whereas most dispute value as a monetary policy instrument. however. a new argument shows that reserve requirements may subvert efficient deposit pricing and thereby aggravate asset quality and bank solvency problems. The argument relates to the recent proposal that the private capital should play an expanded role in monitoring the exposure of
We examine the potential of a commercial bank's excess reserves to signal asset quality in an environment without deposit insurance (the results apply so long as deposit insurance remains incomplete] and the risk of each assets is a priori unknown to all except the bank. In such a setting, the efficient pricing of deposits depends on a depositor's ability to the risk characteristics of the bank's assets. It is sbown excess reserves can signal the unknown risk and thus resolve the asymmetry. The ability to signal using excess reserves varies inversely. however, reserve requirements. Thus, reserve re- may impede the ability of excess reserves lo inform market participants. Reserve requirements are likely to impede signaling when loan rates and reserve requirements are high, or reserve requirements are but a deposit base is large. Reserve requirements are unlikely to impede signaling when banks are similar in their asset characteristics. The underlying intuition is discussed in section signaling may be important because of its potential in facilitating private sector's monitoring of banks. We show that any effort to expand the private market's monitoring of bank asset quality through more accurate deposit pricing presupposes an appropriate regulatory milieu. Exposing large depositors to losses may be a precondition for expanding the role of the private capital markets. but this analysis indicates that reserve requirements inappropriate discount window pricing can subvert such efforts. The potential for conflict between the Federal Reserve. focusing on monetary policy, and the deposit insurers, seeking to mitigate their monitoring burden and exposure. is palpable. Thus. the model clarifies the conditions necessary to engage the private market in monitoring hank asset quality through deposit pricing. These requirements are formidable and the interdependence of regulatory conslraints for monetary policy and bank soundness purposes frustrate programs based on piecemeal reform. The model posits a risk-neutral two-period economy where each issues deposits and makes risky loans at the outset. Although asset quality varies across banks, the choice of assets is not endogenous. This is an important simplification since, in general. a bank's asset choice will impinge on the posited signaling problem. Loans may default or be repaid at the end the first period. or may be extended for a second period at the borrower's option and then be repaid or default. Thus. from lender's perspective loans have both default risk and duration uncertainty. The duration of deposits is likewise uncertain because of withdrawals that may occur at the end of period. Deposits are assumed to be exogenous. Endogenous deposits complicate model unnecessarily since we address neither bank nor the manner in which the bank's asset choice is influenced by the sensitivity of deposit supply to that choice.
If deposits are withdrawn. the bank will repay principal and interest provided loans have either been repaid, or if repayment the end of the second period is anticipated. In the latter case, deposit withdrawals will be financed with the bank's reserves together borrowings at the discount window. If deposits are retained, will be redeemed with interest at the end of the second period provided loans are repaid. The second period payoffs are random for both the bank and the depositors because of loan defaults. The bank alone knows the probability distribution associated with the terminal payoff of its loans: the depositors are a priori uninformed. Since depositon are uninsured, however. they are concerned about the loan payoff distribution. bank is required to maintain a specified fraction of its in the form of noninterest-bearing cash assets. It is free. of course. to hold reserves in excess of requirements. The motivation for holding excess from the informational to avoid borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount window at a possibly punitive interest rate.
The discount window interest rate is a pricing policy that maximizes a welfare function (a weighted average of consumer welfare and expected bank profits), and generates a nonnegative expected profit for each bank. This reflects an attempt t o capture regulator behavior. Thus. the regulator's is modeled as that of designing an optimal window pricing policy. taking reserve requirements as given. There are two ways of viewing this. One is as a optimization problem for the regulator, taking as given the practice of fixing reserve requirements for protracted periods. The other views reserve requirements as a regulatory tax without monetary policy purpose.
The derived optimal discount-window pricing policy has the desirable feature of inducing each bank to reveal its quality Thus, interest rate is a function of the bank's excess reserves, and this function is designed so that each choice of excess reserves signals asset quality. There is. therefore, a discount rate for each depending on its excess reserves. Banks with greater excess reserves are rewarded lower discount rates. The intuition is as follows. Holding excess reserves-in the absence of signaling considerations-has two effects.
is the benefit of having a buffer stock of liquidity to satisfy an unexpected deposit withdrawal. The other is the opponunity cost of forgoing loan revenues. The latter cost of holding excess reserves is clearly greater for a bank with better asset quality. Moreover, such a bank is less averse to the higher discount rate that accompanies smaller excess reserves because it is less likely to require discount-window financing. Thus. the optimal discount-window pricing policy induces better quality banks lo choose lower excess reserves. Consequently, each bank reveals its private information through its choice of excess reserves, thereby facilitating pricing of uninsured deposits. In this environment required reserves convey no information since are not an object of bank choice, except in a trivial sense. They may. however.
the informational role of excess reserves. Reserve requirements have three distinct effects the signaling capability of excess reserves. The primary effect is a constriction of the values over which excess reserves be varied. Thus. some banks may be powerless to signal, these are shown lo be the lower-quality banks. There are. however, two other countervailing effects. First, increased reserve requirements desensitize the signaling schedule to cross-sectional variations the asset-quality parameter. Thus, excess reserves (as a signal) change less with bank quality.
signaling for the entire cross-section of banks may be possible even truncated feasible excess reserve values. In addition, increased reserve Thns, reserve requirements may impair the capital market's ability to discipline the risk-taking proclivities of hanks-hy making them pay a risk-senprice for their liabilities-at a when public regulators are seeking to increase private sector's role in monitoring asset quality. Although the Federal Reserve's 119801 discount-window pricing policy embodies nonlinearities as required by this model, it is difficult to say how similar the existing pricing schedule is lo the derived (optimal) schedule. Moreover.
alternative signaling instruments (such as the bank's financial structure) are examined. it is not clear that excess reserves is the optimal instrument for signaling bank asset
The limited objective is to clarify a substantially ignored information-related cost associated with reserve At a more fundamental level. paper illustrates the theory of second best. as in Lipsey and Lancaster
The remainder is in three sections. Section develops the model. Section examines implications, and section concludes. (Formal are in an appendix available from the authors upon request.)
THE MODEL
Consider an economy in which all are risk neutral, and there are two time periods. The fist begins at I = and ends at r = and the second begins at = 1 and ends at = 2. The economy consists of banks. borrowers. depositors and a governmental regulator. Depositors entrust their funds to banks. and banks purchase risky loans from borrowers. For convenience. it is assumed that there is no deposit insurance. and that have no capital. financial or otherwise.' The regulator two policy variables. instructs banks at I = to retain at minimum a fraclion, of its deposits as legal reserves, and it establishes the interest factor (one plus the interest rate), at which banks can borrow at the discount window. though the results are unaffected if excess reserves interest at a rate less than that expected on loans, reserves are assumed to earn no interest. The fraction of deposits a bank holds as excess reserves is
The decision sequence follows. At = each bank obtains a fixed amount of deposits, D. It thereupon allocates required reserves of
I . model
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BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS cess reserves of 6D. It invests the remainder, in two-period loans of which some unknown fraction will be prepaid at = without penalty to the borrower. At r = neither the bank nor the borrower knows whether the loan will be prepaid at r = repaid at I = 2, or defaulted at either = 1 or 2. The loan will have a one-period maturity with probability 9 and a two-period maturity with probability (1 -At = 1, the borrower discovers whether it has a one-period or a two-period loan. One-period borrowers default with probability -q, e and two-period borrowers default with probability -
The haok is assumed lo as much as the borrowers at = 1. 2, so that borrowers are unable to misrepresent their default in the hope of securing better terms. The duration of deposits is likewise uncertain. With probability a all dcposits will be withdrawn at = and with probability (I-a) all deposits will remain with the bank until I = 2. If deposits are withdrawn and all loans are prepaid, the process at r = 1 with depositors receiving where is the one-period interest factor. If loans are prepaid without a deposit withdrawal, excess reserves and receipts are reinvested at the one-period interest rate. Rterm structure of interest rates is assumed to be flat and nonstochastic, so that the two-period interest factor.) The process then terminates at I and two-period depositors receive
If the bank's are for one and it defaults. and if deposits are withdrawn, the process at = with the depositors receiving the required and excess reserves. The bank is left nothing. If deposits are not withdrawn, the bank invests its excess reserves at the one-period interest rate for the second period: depositors then receive the required reserves plus R times the excess reserves at I = 2.
If loans are for two periods but deposits are withdrawn, the uses its reserves borrows at the discount window in order to repay depositors. In this case, if the loans default at = 2, the central bank will be unable to collect its discount-window advances. If loans are not prepaid deposits are withdrawn, borrowing the discount window will be unnecessary and depositors recover their funds if and when loans are repaid. Figure sketches the sequence. For simplicity, both withdrawal of deposits and partial default on loans have been out. Thus, all loans and deposits are either for period or for two, and all loans are either totally repaid or totally defaulted. These assumptions simplify algebra without analytical effect.
Assume lhat banks differ only in loan duration probability which varies in the interval (0.1). Later we will assume lhat is the support of the density function over each bank's This implies that banks are observationally identical from the regulator's viewpoint. so that the cross-sectional density function is also the regulator's prior density over each bank's This assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We can Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reprodudion prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assume observable differences between banks so long as a hank knows more about its own than the regulator. For example. we could assume the regulator believes that bank lies in and intervals vary across Subscripts are dispensed with, however. because the results are unchanged under the more general specification. is assumed to be sufficiently smaller than so that one-period loans are preferred to two-period loans. Thus. a larger indicates better asset quality as well as shoner duration. For each loan dollar, the debtor is obligated to repay (principal plus interest) if rcpaymcnt occurs at = I. and > if repayment occurs at I = 2. Although one-period loans dominate those for two periods, a bank would not be in position to increase expected profit by simply writing all loan contracts for one period, even if asset choice were endogenous. Recall that neither the bank nor the borrower knows whether the latter will require a loan for period or for two. Thus. even if the bank were to write a one-period contract. a two-period borrower would be unable to repay at I = Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
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ECONOMIC INQUIRY
An informational asymmetry is by assuming that each bank knows its own but depositors the regulator do not. In general, and will be functions of q,, Thus. if and R, are publicly observable and the market for loans is perfectly competitive, the risk-neutrality assumption would permit a private information to be inferred by inverting loan interest rates using a zero expected profit condition for the bank. Such inference not necessarily be possible. if banks enjoyed some monopoly power in the loan market. Therefore. it is assumed that and exceed their competitive values and tbis premium is not known by depositors or the regulator. Although interest rate factors will vary banks, noisy inference may be possible. Thus. the regulator's prior about i's private information parameter, 0,. will be that it lies in some interval.
and these intervals vary across banks. This means that the problem under study should be viewed as applying to a specific bank. with the regulator solving such a problem for each baok.
2 It is also possible.
however. to think of groups of observationally distinct banks.
identical members within each group. Depositors are risk neutral and deposits are competitively priced. Thus both and will exceed R since assets are risky and deposits are uninsured. Moreover. because represents a two-period interest factor and a one-period factor. R, Since D . are exogenous, bank need choose fixing its excess reserves and loan volume. Although also assumed to be fixed. the effects of varying reserve requirement ratio, will be examined later. The regulator's is to choose the discount rate factor, Since the signaling potential of excess reserves is of interest. the regulator's decision is described as being contingent on the bank's choice of 6. The regulator, tberefore. must to a schedule. and allow the bank to choose regulator chooses this schedule to maximize a welfare function described later.
The bank's choice of will depend on its since excess reserves are diverted from loans. Thus, the bank sacrifices lending opportunities for liquidity and this depends on the profitability of the bank's lending opportunities as indexed by 0. The regulator's policy schedule therefore can be written as Alternatively, the regulator can be viewed as asking each to disclose its 0, whereupon it awards the bank based on the reported 8. This is the approach followed here. It is equivalent to interpreting as a signal with k i n g based on Modeling the regulator's problem in this way is consonant with the revelation principle by Mycrson which implies that the regulator restrict itself to those policies that require the bank to its without incentive to misrepresent. expected present value of this profit is obtained by discounting with the one-period interest factor R, and then multiplying with q,, the probability that the loans will he repaid. and a.
probability of a deposit withdrawal. The term + -is t h e hank's net profit per dollar of deposits if one-period loans are repaid at = 1 and deposits are not withdrawn. Multiplication of this profit If each bank has unlimited lending at given 0, then the bank the largest will borrow the loanable funds of all the other banks at a risk-adjusted rate that is less than what other banks could on their loans, but is still low enough lo produce positive profits for the borrowing bank. This will result in all direct lending being done by one With a upper bound on each bank's lending, possibly resulting from a capital constraint or some other scale restriction. however, there will be a continuum of distinguished by their respective with Fed funds trading at = 0.
Although regulator does not know each bank's it has a prior density which is strictly positive over the interval zero elsewhere. As discussed earlier, the prior density function could be defined over to denote the regulator's bank-specific priors. n(e) s
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ECONOMIC INQUIRY
Expressions (7) and (8) define and Because are risk neutral and deposits are priced in a perfectly competitive market, both are determined so that the depositors' expected payoff counted at the risk-free interest rate equals the initial deposit. Equation (10) is another definition, and (11) is an incentive compatibility constraint indicating that under the regulatory policy no bank should wish to misrepresent. Constraint (12) limits the range of according to the reserve requirements. and constraint (13) restricts the discount rate; if discount rate exceeds the interest rate on bank loans, the discount facility will never he used. Finally. (14) ensures that profits can be ordered higher denoting higher expected profit. Thus. a bank is worse off with one-period than with two-period loans after has discovered the borrowers' types at = 1. It is assumed that is sufficiently high and q, is sufficiently greater than so that (13) (14) do not impose binding restrictions on the domains of and which are endogenously
The reader may wonder if a simpler model might suffice. To see why is unlikely, let us recapitulate. Since reserves are commonly justified as a buffer against liquidity needs stemming from stochastic deposit withdrawals, a model is needed with at least two periods and uncertain deposit withdrawals. Since we wish to examine the ability of excess reserves to convey information about bank asset least two types of earning assets are required. Moreover, the two assets must vary in maturity if all loans are for one period, the bank would be lo terminate at the of the period without concern for liquidity. If loans were known to for two periods. then either there is no liquidity problem accompanying an unanticipated deposit withdrawal at the end of the first period (because first period deposit withdrawals could be financed discount dow borrowing, or elsewhere). or the liquidity problem would be so severe as to force the suspension of operation. In either case, the bank's liquidity problem would be unrelated asset quality. Therefore. a model is needed in which liquidity and asset quality are linked, so that reserves that provide liquidity also have the potential to signal asset quality. Note too that 5. ( 5 ) (14) later (11). be representation. (13), (14) ?his ir equivalent sanuming that the locial mu mirprieing dpporiu is we want signaling along a continuum, which is the reason for choosing the probability of having a one-period loan as the private information parameter. The alternative of assuming that a bank knows its loan duration quality at the regulator does not-leads to comer solutions. Moreover. such private information is not particularly interesting in this context because it is verifiable ex post.
(7). (8), (9A). (9B). (10). (12),
This formulation assumes lhat the regulator desires to have the market correctly price deposits, and prices discount borrowings accordingly. Since the regulator seeks to maximize social welfare, however. such a policy will be pursued only if signaling is welfare improving. We therefore need to know the costs of deposit pricing according to "average quality"
could be expected in the absence of signaling. This analysis implicitly assumes that there are potential entrants into banking who are "lemons." Without ex ante signaling of asset quality. these new lenders would enter and depositors with rational would price deposits to reflect their presence. sufficient density of lemons, deposit yields would be so high that lending by even the better-quality banks would be impeded. In the distortion would lead to market failure. The next section shows that with signaling, it is optimal for poorer banks to withdraw from the market leading to a welfare exists a solution to the optimization program expressed in (5) to (14).
The properties of the optimal by asterisks) regulatory policy are considered next.
is decreasing in 8. As indicated earlier, banks with better asset quality hold less excess reserves.
PROPOSITION 3. An that is increasing in is always incentive compatible; and if banks sufficient rents in the loan market, the set of incentive-compatible regulatory policies will contain only those schedules that are strictly increasing in An that is increasing in is incentive compatible because is decreasing in and an that moves in the opposite direction encourages low banks to keep high excess reserves. However, even an that is nonincreasing may be incentive compatible. This could happen if and are sufficiently low so that variations in do not decisively affect the bank's expected profit. Because need be monotonic in (see equation (7)). a bank may choose to keep excess reserves and pay a higher discount rate if it gains sufficienlly from a lower But if and are high, a bank that keeps large excess reserves forgoes and must be rewarded with a discount rate that is decisively lower than that of a borrower with a low F.
The final result addresses the adverse impact of reserve requirements. 
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BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS lower Moreover. the higher the legal reserve the larger may be the set of for which differentiation is precluded. For this proposition to be have a large support and be sufficiently dispersed. Reserve requirements affect excess-reserve based signaling in three distinct ways. First and most obviously. an increase in s constricts range over which excess reserves can be varied. This impedes the ability of lowerquality banks to signal. Second, higher reserve requirements desensitize the signaling schedule.
to changes in Thus. increases more slowly with decreases in and this tends to reduce the direct effect of the constricted range of variation in a smaller set of bank types at the lower end of the quality may be inhibited from signaling. Finally, an increase in reserve requirements reduces aggregate lending. bank profits and consumer welfare? Consequently. fewer banks will seek or be granted charters and a less disparate set of needs lo be signaled. Reserve requirements are likely to impede signaling in two situations. If loan rates and and reserve requirements are high. increases in are likely to interfere with signaling. With high loan rates. banks will differ in their preferences for combinations of reserves. discount rate, and the and two-period deposit rates. Thus. will be relatively sensitive, even for values of and will approach the upper bound. relatively But is reduced by the increase i n s , could reach its upper bound at a high value of 0.
Signaling also may impeded when is small, hut D is large. In this case, the profit in the good state is large even though the loan est rates may be high. Thus. variations in induce large changes in expected profits. This means that the preferences of banks with different for different combinations of signals and payoffs are more sharply delineated. This again sensitizes hence increases the likelihood of attaining the upper bound of at a high value of An increase in reserve requirements also could make additional low banks unprofitable and thereby reduce the range of over which signaling occurs. requirements are unlikely to impede signaling when arc similar. For example, contains just two closely-spaced mass points, two possibilities emerge. One is distinguishing among banks is uneconomic in that the costs of signaling exceed potential benefits and 
